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ABSTRACT 
Historically, merger and acquisition (or M&A) activity has occurred in cyclical 
patterns, forming what are known as “merger waves.” To date, there have been a total of 
seven waves. Though it is widely acknowledged that merger waves exist, there is no 
consensus on what drives these waves. Through both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
this paper aims to determine the causes of merger waves and looks at those causes through 
two different lenses: the neoclassical view, which states that economic shocks cause merger 
waves, and the behavioral view, which states that increases in merger activity are due to 
managerial behavior and decisions. By analyzing the economic, political, and technological 
landscapes as well as valuation and interest rate data during periods of intense merger 
activity, I conclude that neoclassical theories are stronger in explaining the first three waves, 
whereas behavioral theories are stronger in explaining the last three waves.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are part of “the market for corporate control” and 
take place when one firm, the “acquirer”, takes over another firm, the “target”. Companies 
merge in order to achieve “synergy”, the concept that the combined value of two companies 
would be greater than the sum of the separate, individual companies due to the enhanced 
cost efficiencies of the new business. By merging, the two companies combine resources 
and therefore have a better chance of controlling the market and dominating their industry or 
industries. Over the years, corporate mergers have occurred in waves, with periods of 
intense merger activity followed by few transactions in the takeover market. For my thesis, I 
will explore what causes these merger waves. More specifically, I will be looking at merger 
waves in the United States, focusing on how these causes can affect the size of the merger 
wave, the type of mergers that take place during that wave (horizontal, vertical, or 
conglomerate mergers), and the industry or industries in which the mergers take place.  
 Mergers and acquisitions represent one of the most crucial activities in corporate 
finance and have become an essential tool for corporate growth and development. In 2017, 
the M&A market experienced $3.7 trillion in transaction volume, becoming the fifth most 
active year on record (Cristerna, 2018). M&A’s possess many benefits that increase profits 
and shareholder value through various strategies. These strategies include economies of 
scale produced by increasing market share, the diversification of product and market risks, 
capitalizing on the expanded use of an existing distribution network through the acquisition 
of new product capabilities, and more (Tamosiuniene, 2009). There is currently debate 
around the causes of merger waves. However, the existing literature tends to side with one 
of two theories: The behavioral theory, which is the belief that merger waves are correlated 
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with high stock market valuations and that they result from the timing of managers’ market 
overvaluations of their firms (Harford, 2005), and the neoclassical theory, which argues that 
merger waves are the result of industry shocks.  
I examine data on historical merger waves and use these two different frameworks in 
order to identify patterns and determine what actually drives merger waves. Since we are in 
the midst of a merger wave, the new data could possibly help to identify a new pattern and 
clarify the causes of these waves. Furthermore, because each merger wave is unique and 
clusters by factors such as time, type, and industry, it will be valuable to further understand 
what specific types of causes can lead to different types of merger waves. More specifically, 
I look at whether these waves are caused by firms combining across different economies in 
order to gain efficiency and capture bigger market shares, or if they are a result of managers 
trying to increase profitability in the short run. By analyzing historical merger waves and the 
economic, political, and technological changes going on during those time periods, we can 
gain a better understanding of what drives merger waves in different economies or industries 
over time. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Considerable research has been conducted on the causes of M&As and it is widely 
acknowledged that merger waves exist. However, there is little research dedicated to 
explaining merger waves. No consensus currently exists as to what actually drives these 
waves. The existing literature tends to use one of two frameworks to analyze merger waves: 
Neoclassical and behavioral. Within those two frameworks are different theories which 
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explain the causes of merger waves. In this literature review, I will be explaining both of the 
frameworks and their underlying theories, as well as providing evidence from existing 
literature that supports these theories. 
1. The Neoclassical View 
The neoclassical view seeks rational explanations for the causes of merger waves and 
assumes the separation of ownership and control, which means that the shareholders of a 
company (the owners) have no direct control over management’s decision making. This 
view also assumes that managers act to maximize shareholder value and/or capital market 
efficiency. This framework stems from the empirical observation that changes in the 
economy, which could be technical or regulatory, cause industries to consolidate in waves 
(Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). There are two main theories of the neoclassical framework: 
The Industry Shock Theory and the Q-Theory of Mergers. 
 
a. Industry Shock Theory: Theoretical Contributions 
 The industry shock theory posits that merger waves result from shocks to an 
industry’s economic, technological, or regulatory environment (Harford, 2005). In 
economics, a “shock” is defined as an unexpected or unpredictable event that affects an 
economy, either positively or negatively. For example, shocks could be the development of 
a new technology, a new fiscal or monetary policy, or even a new law being put into action. 
Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) support this theory by finding interindustry restructurings and 
takeovers are directly related to economic shocks in those industries. They isolated industry 
shocks that drove merger activity during the fourth merger wave in the 1980’s, and studied 
industry-level patterns in takeover and restructuring activity during that time, hypothesizing 
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that corporate takeovers are often the least cost means for an industry’s structure to respond 
to economic shocks.  
 Maksimovic & Phillips (2001) state that firms adjust in size until the marginal 
benefit is equal to the marginal cost of production; as output prices increase, more 
productive firms experience a larger gain in value from the assets that they control. As a 
result, these firms find it optimal to acquire plants from less productive firms in the industry 
even when that involves an increase in the costs of management (Maksimovic & Phillips, 
2001). Similarly, they also find that a positive shock in an industry increases the opportunity 
cost of operating as an inefficient producer in that same industry. Industry shocks alter the 
value of assets and create incentives to transfer those assets to more productive uses. 
Maksimovic & Phillips’s empirical results indicate that assets are more likely to be sold 
when: (1) the economy is undergoing positive demand shocks, (2) when the assets are less 
productive than their industry benchmarks, (3) when the selling firm has more productive 
divisions in other industries, and (4) when the selling division is less productive 
(Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001). When there is a positive demand shock, productive firms 
seek to acquire the assets of less productive firms, whose lack of productivity in comparison 
with its peers is exacerbated by the positive industry shock. 
 Gort (1969) states that mergers occur when two actions are satisfied: 1) a non-
owners’ estimated value of an asset must be higher than that of some owner of that asset, 
and 2) the buyers’ investor surplus, which Gort defines as the difference between the 
investor’s estimated value of the asset and its actual market price, must be greater than that 
investor’s surplus for any other asset that they can buy. Therefore, according to Gort, 
economic disturbances “alter the structure of expectations” (Gort, 1969) and create 
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discrepancies in the valuations needed to produce mergers because they alter the 
expectations of individuals, rendering the future less predictable and leading to an increase 
in the variance in valuations. This variance in valuations is not a result of asymmetric 
information, but instead a result of differing opinions on how an economic disturbance will 
affect the value of a company. Since valuations are merely estimates and investors rely on 
past records to predict future performance, when an economic shock occurs the past 
becomes less effective in predicting the future and the range of estimates increases. This 
leads to more variation and uncertainty in valuations. Using this framework, Gort claims that 
changes in technology and fluctuations in stock prices lead to more M&A activity. When an 
industry experiences a change in technology, this leads to new products or new processes of 
production. Because demand for new products and production costs are now difficult to 
predict from past performance, the variance in investors’ valuations increase and the 
frequency of mergers also increase. When a company experiences a rapid change in its share 
price, this new share price leads to increased variability in valuations. According to Gort, 
positive and negative changes both increase valuation dispersion, but affect merger activity 
in opposite ways: A price increase leads to a decrease in merger activity because acquirers 
are less likely to buy overvalued companies, whereas a price decrease leads to an increase in 
merger activity for the opposite reason.   
Empirical Support 
In support of the industry shock theory, Kleinert and Klodt (2002) examine the causes of 
the five original merger waves in the 20th century. The first merger wave, which occurred 
from 1897 to 1904, was caused by the industrial revolution and then ended with the 
enforcement of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. The act prevented the monopolization of 
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industries and impeded horizontal merger activities, which is the merging of companies in 
the same industry. In response to the new laws controlling horizontal mergers, a second 
wave occurred from 1920 to 1929 and was dominated by vertical mergers (the merging of 
companies involved at different stages of the supply chain process, ie: a car company 
merging with a tire production company) and conglomerate mergers (the merging of 
companies in completely unrelated industries).  
The third wave lasted from 1965-1975 and was caused by the strive for economies of 
scale via mass production in consumer goods industries, by acquiring firms in other markets 
(aka: conglomerate mergers), and by the diversification of products. The fourth wave, which 
lasted from 1984-1988, was less distinct in the US than in Europe because Europe was 
preparing for the completion of the Single Market. As a result, firms tried to convert 
“national champions” into international or European ones. In order to do so, firms aimed to 
achieve synergies by merging production activities with related technologies, leading the 
merger waves to be in technology-intensive industries. Lastly, Kleinert and Klodt (2002) 
claim that the fifth wave, which started in 1995 and was still ongoing at the time of the 
paper’s publication, was driven by globalization and deregulation because they observed 
that the most active industries in that wave were 1) those where a globalized market was of 
importance and 2) where deregulation and liberalization significantly impacted competition 
intensity.  
 
b. Q-Theory of Mergers: Theoretical Contributions 
The Q-ratio is used to determine if a company is over or under valued and equals the 
total market value of a company divided by its total asset value, or the total asset 
Ching 9 
replacement cost (Investopedia, 2003). The Q-theory of mergers draws from the Q-theory of 
investment, which states that a firm’s investment rate should rise with its Q-ratio. A 
company has a “low Q” if the Q-ratio is between 0 and 1. A low Q means that the 
replacement cost of assets is greater than the value of the stock, so therefore the company is 
undervalued. Conversely, if a company has a Q-ratio that is greater than 1, it is considered to 
have a “high Q” and is overvalued.  
Tobin’s Q theory suggests that the Q-ratio is a driving factor behind the investment 
decisions of companies (Tobin, 1969). Companies with a high Q tend to be well managed, 
can generate a return on capital that exceeds the cost of capital, and should invest in more 
assets in order to maximize their shareholders’ value (Tobin, 1969). Therefore, high Q 
companies tend to buy low Q companies, which pose as attractive investment opportunities. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) expand on Tobin’s Q-theory and argue that high Q firms 
tend to buy low Q firms because total takeover returns, or the combined values of the 
merging firms, are larger if the target has a low Q and the acquirer has a high Q. In that 
light, the Q-theory of mergers states that merger waves are a result of the effective 
reallocation of assets that occurs when poorly managed companies (those with a low Q), are 
acquired by better managed companies (companies with a high Q). Markets with widely 
differing Q ratios lead to increased M&A activity and more mergers waves occur in those 
markets.  
Dong et al (2006) investigate the motivators for takeovers by considering empirical 
relationships between the market valuations of firms and a set of takeover characteristics. 
The authors test two different theories of takeovers: the misvaluation hypothesis, which is 
behavioral rather than neoclassical, and the Q hypothesis of takeovers. The misvaluation 
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states that market inefficiencies have important effects on takeover activity. Bidders with 
high valuations try to profit by buying undervalued targets with cash, or by paying equity for 
targets that may be overvalued but still have a lesser value than the bidder. The Q hypothesis 
of takeovers, on the other hand, focuses on how acquisitions redeploy assets and asserts that 
takeovers reallocate the target’s assets to different uses. These uses can generate higher or 
lower payoffs, depending on the business opportunities of the bidder and target firms, as 
well as the quality of their management. According to this hypothesis, Q is an indicator of 
the degree to which a firm can create shareholder value from their invested resources. High 
quality bidders (high Q firms) improve bad targets (low Q firms) more than bad bidders 
improve good targets. Dong et al (2006) establish that the evidence for the Q hypothesis is 
stronger pre-1990, whereas the evidence for the misevaluation hypothesis is stronger post-
1990. This suggests that the Q hypothesis may be better in explaining merger waves that 
occurred before 1990.  
Empirical Support 
 In their paper, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) pooled approximately 118,000 
observations from 1971-2000. They looked at Q, the market to book ratio of each acquiring 
company, and q, the average market to book value of “disappearing” firms, or the acquired 
firms. They examine the effect Q would have on X, a company’s direct investment in 
capital, and how Q-q would affect Y, the acquisitions of the bundled capital. Their results 
suggest that while the effect of Q on X was significant, the effect of Q-q, or the difference in 
Q values between the acquirer and the target, had a significant impact on Y with nearly three 
times that of Q on X. In addition, they also found that wider Q dispersions between 
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acquiring and target companies correlated with increased merger activity, therefore proving 
that widely differing Q ratios lead to merger waves.   
 To test both the misevaluation and Q hypotheses, Dong et al (2006) used the ratio of 
a firm’s price-to-book value of equity (or P/B) as a proxy for Q, and a firm’s price-to-
residual income (or P/V) as well as their P/B for the misevaluation hypothesis. Since P/B 
and P/V provide complementary information about the misevaluation hypothesis, Dong et al 
(2006) performed both univariate and multivariate tests. The authors studied approximately 
1,000 successful and 800 unsuccessful acquisitions bids, then divided the ratios into bidder 
P/B and P/V and target P/B and P/V. They found that bidder valuation ratios, on average, 
were higher than those of their targets. From their sample of 2,916 firms for which they 
could calculate P/B, the average P/B was 4.405 for acquirers and 1.159 for targets—
extremely statistically significant results. The bidder versus target findings are consistent 
with the Q hypothesis. The Q hypothesis predicts that the total gains are generated by 
acquisitions with “bad” targets (lower Q) and “good” bidders (higher Q) than by ones 
involving good targets and bad bidders. Therefore, a higher bidder valuation and lower 
target valuation are associated with high bidder and target returns, which also confirms 
Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) findings that wider dispersions in Q between the target 
and bidding companies lead to increased merger activity. 
 
2. The Behavioral View 
 Whereas the neoclassical view assumed that managers always strive to maximize 
shareholder value and capital market efficiency, the behavioral view relaxes those 
assumptions and proposes that there may be managerial motivation to engage in merger 
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activity (Gugler et al, 2006). The behavioral view is supported by observations that stock 
market valuations are positively correlated with aggregated merger and industry merger 
activity. What separates the behavioral view from the neoclassical view is that managerial 
behavior, rather than economic shocks, is what drives merger waves. Next, I discuss the 
three main theories that make up the behavioral framework.  
 
a. Market Timing Theory: Theoretical Contributions 
 According to the market timing theory, merger waves are driven by overvalued 
markets that have valuation dispersion, and managers try to time these markets by using 
their overvalued shares to acquire lesser valued companies and gain their real assets 
(Lorenzen, 2015). The term “market timing” refers to financing decisions that are intended 
to capitalize on temporary mispricings in the market, usually by issuing overvalued 
securities and purchasing undervalued ones1. This is very similar to the misvaluation 
hypothesis that we discussed earlier. Market timing reveals that while managers may have a 
long-term view, they also consider short-term profitability and success, and therefore may 
cater to short-term mispricing to further this objective (Baker et al., 2004).  
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model of M&As based on stock market 
misvaluations of the combining firms. They theorize that transactions are driven by the stock 
market valuations of merging firms and argue that financial markets are inefficient, causing 
markets to incorrectly value companies during certain periods (Schleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
They assume that management of both the acquiring and target companies are rational and 
                                                     
1 Baker, M., Ruback, R.S., Wurgler, J., 2004. Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey (Working 
Paper No. 10863). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w10863 
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fully informed about their company and industry, therefore they can recognize situations 
when their company and other companies in the industry are incorrectly valued. Overall, 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003) conclude that managers engage in M&A activity to protect 
shareholders from long term wealth loss and exploit their temporarily overvalued stock to 
acquire lesser companies. However, because their stock price is overvalued, the shareholders 
of the acquiring company suffer a short-term loss from the decrease in value post-merger but 
ultimately experience a long-term gain from the company’s acquisition of assets.  
 Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) explore the effects of misvaluation on merger activity, 
which is similar to the market timing theory. They focus on the market-to-book value of 
equity ratios of companies, or M/B, and decompose it into three parts using the formula M/B 
= M/V x B/V, V representing the value of a company. The three parts are firm-specific error, 
time-series error, and long-run value to book. Acquirers with high firm-specific error use 
stock to buy targets with relatively low firm-specific error at times when both firms benefit 
from positive time-series selection error, or when both firms are overvalued in the market. 
Additionally, merger intensity is highly positively correlated with short-run deviations in 
valuation from long-run trends and that low long-run value-to-book (V/B) firms buy high 
long run V/B targets when they control for firm-specific and time-series sector error. 
Therefore, they claim that while it is generally true that higher M/B firms acquire lower M/B 
firms, much of this is driven by short-run deviations in firm and sector level fundamentals. 
They conclude that high short-run value but low long-run value firms may buy high 
long-run value firms in order to substantiate the market’s beliefs and protect shareholders 
from long term wealth loss, which agrees with the market timing theory. Though the 
neoclassical Q theory suggests that successful transactions have large differences in M/B 
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between the bidder and target, Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) claim that failed transactions 
actually have larger differences that completed transactions, while successful deals display 
higher levels of misvaluation. Even in industries that have experienced an economic shock, 
most acquirers in that industry come from the highest misvaluation quintile. Therefore, even 
though economic shocks could be fundamental drives of merger activity, Rhodes-Kropf et al 
believe that misvaluation affects how these shocks are spread throughout the economy. 
Misvaluation affects the method of payment used to conduct transactions, as well as who 
buys whom.  
Empirical Support 
 Schleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model suggests that, since managers act on high 
valuations in order to protect shareholders, the more highly valued acquirer would only 
make a cash bid if the target was undervalued even at the bid price, ie: P < q, or the price is 
less that the cost of capital. According to the authors, this is most likely to happen with 
undervalued targets who experience low returns prior to being acquired. Adrade et al (2001) 
supports them, finding that in 66% of mergers between 1973 and 1998, the value of the 
acquiring company was greater than that of the target company.  
Because the Market Timing theory suggests that managers act in the best interests of 
shareholders, their model also suggests bidder returns from cash acquisitions should be 
positive in the long run. Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that tender offers result in positive 
abnormal bidder returns of 43% in the five years following the merger. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) studied a larger sample of 316 tender offers between 1980-1991 and found that 
acquirers in their study experienced positive long-run returns of 8.5% in the three years 
following the merger, which supports Schleifer and Rhodes-Kropf et al’s findings. 
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Additional evidence comes from Rhodes-Kropf et al, who looked at 4,025 mergers and 
found that the average log(M/B) of acquirers was 0.83 and the average log(M/B) of targets 
was 0.69. They also found that the average long-run V/B of acquirers was 0.39, compared to 
0.58 for the targets. This evidence therefore supports their claims that high M/B firms buy 
low M/B firms and that firms with low long-run value tend to buy firms with high long-run 
value. 
  
b. Agency Cost Theory: Theoretical Contributions 
Agency costs are costs that arise because of core problems such as conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders of a company. Shareholders want 
management to run the company in a way that maximizes shareholder value, but 
management might make decisions that maximize their personal wealth and power. Unlike 
the market timing theory which assumes that managers of a company act in the interest of 
their shareholders, the agency cost theory of M&As states that merger activity results from 
managers acquiring firms for their own self-interests and motivations such as profit 
maximization and job security (Cummings and Xie, 2008). There are multiple reasons why 
M&As could benefit managers. Cummings and Xie (2008) believe managers may 
intentionally acquire companies that require their personal skills, which would make it 
harder for shareholders to replace them. Managers may also be motivated to engage in non-
value enhancing mergers in order to increase the size of their firm and their compensations. 
Jensen (1986) adds to this, stating that growth of a company increases the amount of 
resources under its control, therefore increasing managers’ power and compensation. 
Additionally, the fact that firms tend to reward middle managers through promotions rather 
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than bonuses leads to a managerial bias towards growth through acquisitions, because 
growing the company adds more positions and creates more opportunities for promotion 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, M&As are motivated by managerial self-interest, and they are 
unlikely to generate operating or financial synergies and valuations could decrease post-
merger.  
In a later paper, Jensen (2005) explains that managers who act out of self-interest 
only focus on short-term gains for their companies. Being a CEO, CFO, or manager of a 
company with an overvalued stock is dangerous because a company cannot produce 
performance that is required to justify that stock price, except by pure luck. The market 
expects an overvalued company to keep outperforming in order to sustain their high 
valuation. But since that is impossible, managers start to make decisions that destroy long-
run value of the company but generate the market’s expected performance in the short-run. 
Despite knowing that they are unable to meet their market-projected growth, managers 
pursue mergers that are potentially destructive to the company’s long-term value, 
postponing the problem until they have left the company.  
Empirical Support 
In their study, Moeller et al (2005) provide evidence on the magnitude of the agency 
costs of overvalued equity. They looked at 4,136 acquisitions from 1998 to 2001, 87 of 
which were “large loss” deals that experienced significant losses post-merger. The aggregate 
wealth loss associated with the large loss deals was $397 billion, while the other 4,049 
acquisitions made a total gain of $157 billion. The acquiring firms lost a total of $240 billion 
in comparison to a loss of $4.2 billion in all of the 1980’s. The authors also note that though 
the large loss deals represented only 2.1% of acquisitions from 1998 to 2001, they accounted 
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for 43.4% of the money spend on acquisitions during that period. In addition, the losses to 
bidders were offset by the gains to sellers for a net synergy gain of $11.5 billion in the 
1980’s. However, from 1998-2001, the losses to acquirers exceeded gains to the target firms, 
resulting in a net synergy loss of $134 billion.  
Jensen (2005) also presents the case of Nortel, a real-life illustration of the agency 
cost theory which shows that management was destroying value through the company’s 
acquisitions. Between 1997 and 2001 Nortel was under the leadership of its new CEO, John 
Roth. During this time, Nortel acquired 19 companies at a price of more than $33 billion and 
paid for many of these acquisitions with Nortel stock, which increased dramatically during 
that same period. When Nortel’s stock price collapsed, most of these acquisitions had to be 
written off as losses (Jensen. 2005). Nortel’s effort to transform itself clearly damaged the 
company and its shareholders. At the end of 2001, the company was valued at $24 billion 
and its share price fell by more than 90% from its peak in September 2000. Nortel’s share 
price was also 44% lower than it was on October 1, 1997, when Roth took over as CEO. 
Jensen (2005) estimates that the agency cost of overvalued equity for Nortel, or the total loss 
experienced by shareholders, was $44.5 billion. But, Nortel’s decline did not stop there—the 
price drop suffered by Nortel didn’t just involve the elimination of its overvaluation, but it 
also involved a significant destruction of its core value, mainly through acquisitions and 
overinvestment (Jensen, 2005).  
 
c. Managerial Discretion Theory: Theoretical Contributions  
The third and final of the behavioral theories is the managerial discretion theory, or the 
managerial theory. This theory is similar to the agency cost theory and its assumption that 
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managers act in their own self-interest, but it states that managers pursue to grow their firms 
through mergers either because their incomes are tied to growth or because they get 
“psychic income” from managing a large firm (Gugler et al., 2012). Psychic income is 
defined as the nonmonetary or nonmaterial satisfactions one gets from an occupation or 
economic activity, such as the feeling of being powerful or important (Financial Times 
Lexicon).  
According to Gugler et al. (2012), merger waves occur during stock market booms 
because optimism in the market allows growth-seeking managers to undertake more wealth-
destroying mergers than under normal conditions. These managers pursue growth through 
M&A activity even though it may not be in the best interest of their shareholders, and it is 
shown that report weak or negative effects of mergers on the profitability and sales of 
companies (Gugler et al., 2012). Under the behavioral view, the common “shock” that 
causes a merger wave is the increase in optimism in the market, which leads to a stock 
market boom.  
The past two behavioral theories hypothesized that merger waves are caused by 
managers’ reactions to overvalued stock prices, which only accounts for mergers financed 
through stock. As a solution, Gugler et al. (2012) offers the managerial theory, which covers 
different financing options. It states that firms that are not overvalued may still undergo 
mergers when optimism in finance markets is high, choosing to finance the merger with cash 
or issue debt. Therefore, when optimism in equity markets increases, the market’s constraint 
weakens on managers who wish to grow their companies through mergers that destroy 
shareholder wealth. As a result, more mergers take place and a merger wave occurs.  
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Conclusion 
 In summary, the extant literature does not reach a consensus. The research on M&As 
is extensive, but there is little research on the actual causes of merger waves. Also, much of 
the literature is older and refers to the 20th century merger waves. As we are now in the 
midst of a merger wave, new data could possibly help identify a new pattern and clarify the 
causes of the current waves. My contribution to the existing literature will be to isolate the 
cause of merger waves, whether it agrees with the aforementioned theories or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
 If one considers the total number of M&A transactions that have occurred 
throughout history, they would find that M&A activity is highly cyclical and occurs in 
waves. As shown in Figure 1, a total of six completed merger waves have occurred since the 
1880’s and we are currently in the midst of a seventh wave. Figure 2 focuses on the last four 
merger waves, showing the number of M&A transactions in North America since 1980 
compared to the total value of M&A transactions by year compared to GDP for that year.  
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Figure 1- Merger waves in the US from 1851-2017 (estimated) 
 
 
Figure 2- Total M&A in North America vs. Value of transactions as a percent of GDP 
 
 
In order to explain this cyclical pattern in M&A activity and relate it to neoclassical 
theories, I first look at each individual wave and the shocks that occurred in the 
corresponding time period (regulatory and political changes, technological advances, and 
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economic shocks). Then, I analyze the last three waves by looking at valuations and interest 
rates during those periods in order to relate it to behavioral theories. As previously 
mentioned, there is no consensus on the exact cause of these waves, but the literature tends 
to side with either the neoclassical view or the behavioral view. Through my combination of 
analyses, I hope to provide my own explanation on the causes of these waves. 
 
I. A Neoclassical Analysis, by Wave 
The First Wave: 1896-1903 
 
 The first merger wave came to be known as the “great merger movement” and was 
comprised of mostly horizontal mergers that consolidated the manufacturing industry. At 
this time in history, the US had just come out of The Panic of 1893 and was experiencing a 
period of economic prosperity. In addition, the US was going through a period of 
industrialization and reform which created opportunities in the manufacturing industry 
though technological innovation. The invention of the steam engine led to the creation of a 
well-developed national railroad network which allowed the US to exploit high scale 
economies and removed many of the physical constraints on businesses, allowing them to 
expand their distribution channels all over the US (Keinert and Klodt, 2002; Banerjee & 
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Eckard, 1998). Also around this time, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was 
experiencing its largest trading volumes to date due to revolutionary technological 
developments such as the telephone, which reduced trading time from 15 minutes to 6 
seconds (Reference for Business). This increase in trading volume reflected the rise of large 
corporations and industry wide trusts, reaching a high of 3 million shares in 1901. As a 
result, stock prices during this period were a reasonable reflection of a firm’s performance 
and could therefore provide information on the future prospects of the firm, including 
potential mergers (Banerjee & Eckard, 1998).  
 In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlawed monopolistic 
business practices in the US. However, in 1895, the supreme court decision in the E.C. 
Knight case placed the mergers of manufacturing firms outside the reach of the act and 
therefore outside the jurisdiction of Federal regulation. Therefore, there were no legal 
barriers to mergers which led to an increase in merger activity during this time (Banerjee & 
Eckard, 1998). In addition, antitrust enforcement reached an all-time low during the 
Mckinley Presidency from 1897-1901. This lack of restraint allowed firms to consolidate 
into industrial trusts with market shares so large that they exceeded 80% in many cases 
(Banerjee & Eckard, 1998). According to O’Brien (1988), this merger wave was a 
temporary acceleration in the growth of firm size and industrial concentration. O’Brien 
(1988) also claims that this wave was motivated by horizontal concentration in order to 
suppress price competition.  
 In 1904, the Supreme Court overturned the previous E.C. Knight ruling in the 
Northern Securities case and nullified a merger between two railroad companies, citing 
concern that the resulting market dominance would negatively affect competition. Mergers 
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for all monopolies were now under Federal Law (Banerjee & Eckard, 1998). This change in 
regulation, as well as the stock market crash of 1904, caused a slowdown in M&A activity 
and ended the first merger wave. 
 
The Second Wave: 1916-1933 
 
 The second merger wave was mainly comprised of oligopolistic mergers in the 
banking sector. According to White (1985), this merger movement was one of the most 
important developments in banking. During this period, many regulatory changes were 
occurring. In 1913, the Federal Reserve Bank was established. In 1914, World War I broke 
out and America became a global lender, replacing London as the center of the financial 
world. Then, in November of 1918, the National Bank Consolidation act was passed and 
established a formal procedure for the consolidation of national banks. Prior to the act, if 
two national banks wanted to merge one had to be liquidated while the other purchased its 
assets and assumed its liabilities (White, 1985). After this act was passed, merging was more 
flexible; rather than having to fully liquidate, two national banks could consolidate under 
either’s charter, they just had to specify the amount of capital, surplus, and undivided profits 
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in the new merged organization and which assets would be eliminated, if any. This act only 
applied to mergers between two national banks and a national bank wanting to merge with a 
state bank still had to go through the old procedures. As a result, leading national banks 
started abandoning their national charters to merge with state banks, which prompted the 
creation of the McFadden Act of 1927. This act allowed a national bank to consolidate with 
a state bank under the new rules, encouraging more mergers in the banking industry (White, 
1985).  
Additionally, in response to the Sherman Act of 1980 which banned the formation of 
monopolies through horizontal mergers, the Clayton Act in 1914 encouraged vertical 
mergers and the formation of oligopolies (Owen, 2006). This act served as a catalyst for the 
second merger wave, which could be seen in the banking industry. According to White 
(1985), banks during this time period needed bigger loans in order to continue serving their 
industrial customers, a group that was increasing rapidly. Since loans were capped at 10% of 
a company’s capital, banks turned to mergers as a quick way of increasing their capital in 
order to increase their loan sizes. Once earnings from commercial loans started to decline, 
these banks had to seek new ways to maintain and increase their income and moved into the 
trust and investment banking businesses through vertical mergers, which allowed them to 
quickly acquire the expertise and reputation necessary for success.  
After the end of WWI, the Wilson administration put “unconventional handcuffs” on 
the banking sector by establishing the World War Foreign Debts Commission Act in 1922, 
which insisted that all debtor countries pay back their war loans to America (Investopedia). 
This caused a slowdown in world trade and created hostility toward American goods. Then 
in September of 1929, the stock market crashed on what is infamously known as Black 
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Tuesday and the world economy was knocked out, leading to the Great Depression in 
October. The Fed could not contain the crash and refused to stop the Depression. All banks 
suffered as a consequence, therefore ending the second merger wave.  
 
The Third Merger Wave: 1960-1975 
 
 The third merger wave is often characterized as a wave of conglomerate mergers. 
After World War II ended in 1945, the US emerged from the war as the world’s richest and 
most militarily powerful country. The overall economy grew 37% during the 1950s and by 
the end of the decade, the average family had 30% more purchasing power than in the 
beginning. The US stock market rose significantly (Owen, 2006). As a result of this new 
economic prosperity, profitable companies found themselves with large cash flows. Because 
they didn’t want to pay out this extra money to shareholders via dividends, they instead 
turned to the market for corporate control and reinvested the money back into their 
businesses by acquiring other companies. However, as these firms sought to expand, they 
also faced tougher antitrust enforcement from the government. In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver 
Act was passed, which strengthened the anti-merger provisions of the Clayton Act and 
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addressed loopholes. Now, the government was scrutinizing horizontal and vertical mergers 
and companies that wanted to expand found their only option was to form conglomerates 
(Gaughan, 2017). 
As Owen (2006) notes, the number of conglomerate firms increased from 8.3% of 
Fortune 500 firms in 1959 to 18.7% in 1969. Conglomerate mergers offer a means of 
diversification for companies—for example, General Electric is a conglomerate and has a 
number of businesses under its name such as healthcare, transportation, and energy. This 
diversification serves as a method for companies to reduce cash flow volatility through 
reducing exposure to industry specific risks (Nouwen, 2011). Therefore, during this time 
many companies paid for their acquisitions using stock and opted for conglomerate mergers 
so they could expand into new markets and areas and reduce risk. This third wave ended 
with the 1973 oil crisis, when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries targeted the US, amongst other countries, by proclaiming an oil embargo and 
severely increasing the price of oil per barrel. As a result of this crisis, there was a sharp 
increase in inflation and a worldwide economic downturn, halting all merger activity.  
 
The Fourth Wave: 1980-1990  
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 During the 1980’s people started to see economic reforms as burdensome to 
economic growth, and US financial sector resultantly experienced a lot of deregulation. At 
this same time, there were a lot of innovative compensation schemes being established for 
top executives (Santomero, 2003). These schemes included a significant increase in the use 
of stock options as compensation, which was supposed to improve management’s incentives 
to increase shareholder value. Many people argue that such compensation schemes placed 
more emphasis on short term rather than long term performance and could have also 
possibly led to managerial greed and mergers that would solely increase management’s 
compensation. In order to increase valuations, more innovative compensation programs 
were also put into place in order to encourage executives to take greater risks and engage in 
more creative accounting in order to improve their reported earnings and drive their bottom 
line. Management started to promote an aggressive corporate culture and no one held these 
companies in check. 
 Due to this aggressive corporate culture, most of the bids in the fourth merger wave 
were hostile, meaning that they did not have the approval of the target company’s 
management (Nouwen, 2011) and that companies relied on aggressive and innovative 
financial and legal techniques to acquire target companies and secure voting control 
(Cheffins, 2015). This new wave was also characterized by “bust-up takeovers”, or 
takeovers where large fractions of the target company’s assets were sold post-acquisition. 
According to Goldstein (2000), some believe that hostile takeovers served as a form of 
corporate governance because the threat of takeover would exert pressure on corporate 
managers to act in the interest of shareholders. Financial market pressure should motivate 
poorly performing management to do better, as well as function to discipline and replace 
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inefficient managers. While companies used cash and stock to finance M&As in the 
previous waves, mergers in the fourth wave were leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and were 
heavily financed by debt (Nouwen, 2011). Therefore, the fourth merger wave was comprised 
of hostile takeovers because poor managerial incentive schemes combined with equally 
ineffective corporate governance mechanisms allowed corporate mismanagement to flourish 
throughout 1970-1980 (Owen, 2006). However, this wave came to an end due to the early 
1980’s recession and a slowdown of the debt market, which dried up financing for these 
mergers.  
 
The Fifth Wave: 1993-2000  
 
 The 1990’s were seen as a decade of great economic prosperity. After the 1990-1991 
recession, financial markets were booming and the globalization process accelerated 
(Nouwen, 2011). In order to keep up with economic growth and increasing global demand, 
U.S. companies targeted companies abroad and the number of cross-border acquisitions 
increased significantly. This wave was less distinct in the US than in Europe, which is 
shown by its small size in Figure 1. Also, Figure 3 shows that the number of M&A 
transactions in Europe far surpassed those in the US in 1999 and 2000, even reaching one of 
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its highest peaks in 2000. During this time, Europe was preparing for the creation of the 
Single Market, which allowed all countries involved to trade with each other without 
restrictions or tariffs. In response, countries tried to convert their strongest firms into 
international competitors, merging their production activities with related technologies and 
causing M&A activity to take place in technology intensive industries (Kleinert & Klodt, 
2002).  
 
Figure 3- Number of M&A Transactions in Europe vs. US  
 
According the Nouwen (2011), the fifth wave began as a result of technological 
innovations such as information technology, as well as a refocus of companies on their core 
competencies in order to gain competitive advantage. US corporations wanted to participate 
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in the globalization of the economy, which led to the creation of “mega” deals—such as 
Exxon and Mobil and Citibank and Travelers—that were unthinkable before this wave. 
Gaughan (2001) claims that the fifth wave trended towards consolidating mergers where 
leading firms acquired competitors across the nation in order to build dominant companies. 
According to Gaughan, most of these mergers were in the banking and telecommunications 
industry, spurred on by significant changes in the regulatory environment at the time. In 
2000, the dot com bubble burst and the stock market fell tremendously, losing 10% of its 
value within a few weeks. This marked the end of the fifth wave.  
 
The Sixth Wave: 2001-2008 
 
 The sixth merger wave began after the 2001 recession. At this time, economic 
growth was resurfacing and there was an increase in liquidity into the market due to the 
stimulus from the Federal Reserve which kept interest rates low in order to stimulate the 
economy. Low interest rates also contributed to the rise of private equity funds as levered 
acquisitions became cheaper and the stock market was booming, leading to large amounts of 
available capital and an extremely favorable environment for M&As (Cordeiro, 2014). 
Alexandridis et al (2012), believe that behavioral theories which state that mergers happen 
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when overvalued firms seek to acquire less overvalued assets are unlikely to explain what 
drove the sixth wave. They claim that stock prices during this wave were not overvalued and 
were based on sound fundamentals rather than over-optimistic expectations. To support their 
claim, they provide data that valuations were lower in 2003-2007 than they were during the 
1990’s wave (Alexandridis et al, 2012). Therefore, it is most likely that the sixth wave was 
mainly the result of the availability of abundant liquidity at the time. In contrast, Cordeiro 
(2014) believes that the high liquidity and cheap capital generated distortions and target 
companies ended up being overvalued due to enormous speculation and a lack of detected 
risks from directing a large volume of resources towards “bad” assets.  
However, both authors agree on the economic downturns that ended the wave. In late 
2007, investors and corporate managers started becoming skeptical of Mortgage Backed 
Securities (MBSs) and credit markets. Then in 2008, credit dried up and financing became 
scarce, leading the world into recession and bringing M&A activity to a halt (Alexandridis et 
al, 2012; Corderio, 2014).  
 
The Seventh Wave: 2010-Present 
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The seventh wave is the most current merger wave. Since coming out of the Great 
Recession in 2009, the US economy has been growing. Interest rates are low but starting to 
increase once again, stock prices are at historic highs, and the unemployment rate is at a 49-
year low of 3.7%, with job openings exceeding the number of unemployed Americans by 
more than 650,000 (Morath, 2018). As seen in Figure 4, GDP has climbed $5.1 trillion 
dollars since 2009, and is expected to increase another $0.6 trillion by the end of 2018. 
Figure 5 shows that corporate profits are currently at an all-time high due in part to tax cuts 
(Grocer, 2018), indicating that firms have more money to spend and re-invest in their 
businesses.  
In its 2018 M&A trends report, Deloitte states that corporations now have more spending 
firepower; companies say that their cash levels have increased and that M&A remains the 
number one intended use of those funds (Deloitte, 2018). Technology acquisition is the 
number one driver of M&A pursuits this year and managers are showing a strong bias 
towards vertical integration, especially in life sciences, health care, technology, and financial 
services.  
Figure 4- US GDP from 2000-2018 (estimated) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product [GDPC1], 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1, October 29, 2018. 
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Figure 5- US Quarterly Corporate Profits, since Q3 2015 
 
According to the New York Times, fears of Silicon Valley’s growing ambitions 
helped to drive a record run of M&A activity, with more than $2.5 trillion in mergers 
announced during the first half of 2018 (Grocer, 2018). In addition, four of the ten biggest 
deals during this period were made in part to fend off competition from the largest 
technology companies as the value of acquisitions announced during the first half of 2018 
increased 61% from the same time in 2017 (Grocer, 2018). Companies are turning to M&As 
in order to capture a greater market share and change their business models in order to battle 
companies such as Netflix, Amazon, and other tech companies who are currently trying to 
enter new industries. Along the same lines, a number of larger deals have been in the media 
and healthcare industries—industries that are having to battle tech’s encroachment upon 
their territories. Large media firms are now having to compete with companies like Netflix 
by owning both their content and the platform on which it is provided, and healthcare 
companies must respond to companies like Amazon who are trying to enter the healthcare 
business.  
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II. A Behavioral Analysis, by Wave 
A common theme that underlies all behavioral theories is that merger waves are driven 
by managerial behavior and decisions rather than economic shocks. Another driver of these 
theories is that market valuations are positively correlated with merger activity. However, 
valuation data, such as a company’s stock price, is unavailable for the older merger waves. 
Therefore, I will only consider the valuations of mergers within the last three waves. The 
Buffet Indicator, Warren Buffet’s favorite market valuation tool, is calculated by dividing 
the total market capitalization (aka market cap) of the S&P 500 by US Gross GDP. A 
company’s market cap is defined as its number of shares outstanding multiplied by its stock 
price. According to Buffet, the higher this ratio, the more overvalued the market currently is. 
Figure 6 contains the Wilshire 5000 to GDP ratio as compared to quarterly M&A volumes 
over time for the last three merger waves. The Wilshire 5000 to GDP ratio is identical to 
The Buffet Indicator, but uses the total market cap of the Wilshire 5000 index in the 
numerator rather than the S&P 500.  
Figure 6- Wilshire 5000 to GDP ratio vs. M&A Volume, Quarterly 
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I chose to use the Wilshire 5000 index because it includes all US stocks with readily 
available pricing, covering a wider variety of companies in different industries with different 
market caps than other stock indices. As shown in Figure 6, the Wilshire 5000/GDP ratio 
and M&A volume are positively correlated; as the ratio increases, so does M&A activity. 
This suggests that high market valuations drive mergers and acquisitions. As stated in the 
Market Timing Theory, if market valuations are high, managers are more likely to use their 
companies’ inflated stock prices to acquire the real assets of lower-priced companies.  
 Interest rates also have an impact on valuations, driving merger waves. According to 
Warren Buffet, the higher the interest rate, the greater the downward pull on financial 
valuations. This is because the rates of return that investors need from any kind of 
investment are directly tied to the risk-free rate that they can earn from government 
securities. If the government rate rises, the prices of all other investments must adjust 
downward to a level that brings their expected rates of return into line.  
Figure 7- Federal Funds Rate vs. Number of M&A transactions in the US 
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Conversely, if interest rates fall, the decrease pushes the prices of all other 
investments upward. When perceived valuations are high, even if those valuations may be 
rational, managers might choose to take advantage of their highly valued shares and engage 
in merger activity. Therefore, if we assume that high valuations encourage more M&A 
activity, we can conclude that as interest rates decrease, the number of M&A transactions 
increase. This is shown in Figure 7, which compares the number of M&A transactions in the 
US with the federal funds rate. When the federal funds rate is high, M&A activity is low. 
Additionally, Figure 7 shows that low federal funds rates occur at the same time as the start 
of each of the last three merger waves, indicating that low interest rates are positively 
correlated with an increase in merger activity.  
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Values of Companies Pre and Post Merger 
Though high valuations and interest rates indicate that merger waves are driven by 
managerial reactions to good market conditions, they do not tell us about the motives behind 
managers’ decisions to engage in M&A activity. In order to gain insight into this, I consider 
the major M&A transactions that have taken place during the past three merger waves. By 
“major,” I mean the most publicized mergers at the time with transaction values above $20 
billion. More specifically, I was interested in examining the effect that the transaction had 
on the total value of the company. I considered the market caps of acquiring companies in 
each wave one month pre and post-combination to see if the merger had a positive or 
negative effect on the company’s total market cap. If the value of a company declined post-
merger, then this could suggest that the merger was driven by managerial greed such as 
increasing firm size to increase one’s compensation, regardless of the effect the merger 
would have on shareholders.  
On the other hand, if the value of the company increased, then this could confirm that 
managers engage in mergers to maximize shareholder wealth. Tables 1-3 below present data 
on the “biggest”, or highest value, completed M&A transactions that have occurred in the 
US during the last three merger waves. More specifically, it shows the percent change in the 
market caps of the acquiring companies pre and post-merger. In these mergers, either the 
acquiring company was from the US, the target company was from the US, or both were 
from the US. As stated before, valuation data is difficult to find before these waves, which 
removes them from consideration.  
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Table 1— The Fifth Wave (1993-2000) 
Acquirer Target 
Year 
merged Mkt cap pre  
Mkt cap 
post 
% 
Change 
Worldcom  MCI Communications 1997 NA NA NA 
Exxon Mobil 1998  174.95   267.08  53% 
Citicorp Travelers Group 1998  7.48   4.87  -35% 
Bell Atlantic GTE 1998  76.93   119.22  55% 
BP Amoco 1998  81.64   79.84  -2% 
Vodafone Group Mannesmann 1999 44.8 163.15 264% 
Pfizer Warner Lambert 1999  167.67   285.48  70% 
SBC Communications Ameritech Corp 1999  96.40   99.96  4% 
Vodafone group Airtouch communications 1999  33.98   37.37  10% 
Note: Market cap is in Billions, taken one month pre and post-merger 
 
 
Table 2—The Sixth Wave (2001-2008) 
Acquirer Target 
Year 
merged 
Mkt cap 
pre  
Mkt cap 
post 
% 
Change 
America Online Inc Time Warner 2000  224.00   20.00  -91% 
Comcast Corp 
AT&T Broadband & Internet 
Svcs 2001  35.01   41.12  17% 
Pfizer Inc Pharmacia Corp 2002  176.48   262.81  49% 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co Bank One Corp,Chicago,IL 2004  140.82   139.19  -1% 
AT&T Inc BellSouth Corp 2006  100.68   99.53  -1% 
InBev NV Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc 2008  205.66   165.88  -19% 
Pfizer Inc Wyeth 2009  110.82   146.78  32% 
Glaxo Wellcome SmithKline Beecham Plc.    169.93   158.64  -7% 
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Table 3—The Seventh Wave (2009-Current) 
Acquirer Target 
Year 
merged 
Mkt cap 
pre  
Mkt cap 
post 
% 
Change 
Verizon Communications Inc Verizon Wireless Inc 2013  144.280   134.880  -7% 
T-Mobile US Metro PCS 2013 4 14.77 269% 
Berkshire Hathaway Heinz 2013 273.49 290 6% 
Softbank Sprint 2013 35.55 44.79 26% 
Heinz Kraft 2015 43.21 97.48 126% 
Actavis PLC Allergan Inc 2015  76.39   115.95  52% 
Fortis ITC Holdings 2016 8.7 12.7 46% 
IMS Health Holdings Quintiles Transnational Holdings 2016 9.07 18.7 106% 
TransCanada Columbia Pipeline Group 2016 29.1 37.03 27% 
Johnson Controls Tyco International 2016 26.9 38.08 42% 
Microsoft Linkedin 2016 470.18 484.05 3% 
Baxalta Shire 2016 36.86 55.85 52% 
Anheuser-Busch InBev SAB Miller 2016  205.66   165.88  -19% 
Charter Communications Inc Time Warner Cable Inc 2016  20.81   22.66  9% 
Sherwin Williams Valspar 2017 31.17 32.79 5% 
Northstar Asset Management 
Group 
Northstar Realty Finance & 
Colony Capital 2017 1.7 8 371% 
Abbott Laboratories St Jude Medical 2017 56.57 74.11 31% 
The Dow Chemical Co DuPont 2017  78.67   167.55  113% 
Dell EMC Corp 2017 13.65 16.06 18% 
Century Link Level 3 Communications 2017 14.93 13.13 -12% 
Great Plain's Energy Westar Energy 2018 7.55 15.1 100% 
Marriott International Starwood Group 2018 45.6 44.95 -1% 
AT&T  Time warner 2018 198.35 227.01 14% 
Marathon Petroleum corp Andeavor 2018 37.11 48 29% 
Keurig Green Mountain Dr. Pepper Snapple Group 2018 21.67 33.15 53% 
 
As shown in Table 1 and 3, the majority of the acquiring companies in the fifth and 
seventh waves experienced an increase in value post-merger. However, as shown in Table 2, 
the majority of acquiring companies in the sixth wave experienced a decrease in value post-
merger, which could indicate that mergers in that wave were driven by managerial greed. 
Considering the macroeconomic events during the sixth wave, the US had just emerged 
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from the 2001 recession. Interest rates were low and there was excess money in the market 
due to the stimulus from the Federal Reserve. Finding themselves with a sudden abundance 
of liquidity, managers at this time could have participated in mergers solely to increase their 
compensation or power, rather than maximize shareholder value. This greed could also be a 
result of the corporate climate at the time, which is reflected in the use of risky investment 
vehicles such as the Mortgage-Backed Security—the faulty asset-backed security that was a 
major contributor to the 2008 recession.  
In contrast, the economic environments during the fifth and seventh wave are 
similar, which could explain why values of acquiring companies increased post-merger 
during those waves. In both the fifth and seventh wave, the US economy was expanding, 
and companies are looking to expand in order to stay competitive. For example, companies 
during the fifth wave merged in order to counteract the increasing globalization, while 
companies during the seventh wave are currently merging in order to counteract tech giants 
such as Amazon and Netflix. Additionally, both waves were spurred by technological 
innovations—the development of information technology in the fifth wave and the threat 
and expansion of Silicon Valley in the seventh wave. In order to build dominant and 
competitive companies, managers must have a long term view when making M&A 
decisions. Therefore, it is more likely that managers approached M&A transactions in these 
two waves with the intention to build the company and increase its value post-merger rather 
than increasing their own returns.  
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III. Results 
After examining the economic environments during the seven merger waves, it 
seems as if the first three merger waves were caused as a result of macroeconomic shocks, 
whereas the last three waves were driven by managers’ responses to high market valuations. 
For the fourth wave, it appears it was a result of managerial self-interest, reflected in 
aggressive corporate culture and the hostile takeovers during the period. However, since 
valuation data is not available for mergers during that time frame, I am unable to empirically 
test my conclusion.  
Each of the first three waves acted as responses to economic changes during wave 
preceding it: The first merger wave consisted of horizontal mergers in the manufacturing 
industry and was spurred by technological inventions from the industrial revolution as well 
as a changing regulatory environment, including a loophole in the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
The second wave was a response to the regulations of the first wave that banned horizontal 
mergers and was mainly comprised of oligopolistic mergers. Lastly, with the government 
cracking down on both vertical and horizontal mergers, the third wave therefore consisted of 
conglomerate mergers. In contrast, market valuations were high and interest rates were low 
during the last three merger waves which could have caused managers to engage in merger 
activity in order to increase firm size and maximize either shareholder wealth or their own 
returns. Therefore, this is evidence that neoclassical theories may best explain the causes of 
the first three merger waves while behavioral theories best explain the last three merger 
waves.  
 
  
Ching 42 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In order to determine what drives merger waves, I explored the neoclassical and 
behavioral theories by analyzing a multitude of economic shocks and trends that occurred 
during each merger wave. To find data that aligned with neoclassical theories, I analyzed 
previous economic, political, technological, and regulatory changes that were occurring 
during each time period to see if those changes acted as shocks that caused an increase in 
merger activity. For the behavioral theory, I focused on market valuations and interest rates 
in relation to M&A activity in order to determine if the market was overvalued in times of 
heavy merger activity. Finally, for the last three waves, I looked at the total market 
capitalization of acquiring firms pre and post-merger during to see if the merger had created 
or destroyed value for the firms, which could yield insight into managerial motives for 
participating in mergers.  
Ultimately, I concluded that neoclassical theories are better for explaining the first 
three waves while behavioral theories are better for the last three waves. So, while industry 
shocks and economic changes may have caused the first three waves, the last three waves 
were driven by high market valuations and managers’ decisions to use their company’s 
overvalued stock to acquire companies and expand their businesses. Interestingly, it seems 
as if the sixth wave was driven by managerial greed—which is shown in Table 2 by an 
overall loss in value post-merger—while the fifth and seventh waves appear to be driven by 
managers’ efforts to maximize shareholder value.  The fourth wave, however, was a wave 
consisting of hostile takeovers during a time of increased deregulation and use of stock-
based compensation. Therefore, I hypothesize that managerial behavior was the cause of this 
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wave, but I am unable to test my hypothesis since valuations during that period were 
unavailable to me, given the resources I had access to.  
 My findings on what drives merger waves is important because there is a lack of 
literature surrounding the topic and no consensus currently exists. While there are 
discussions on M&As themselves and the motivation behind mergers, there is very little 
research on the cyclical pattern of merger activity and the actual fundamental causes of 
merger waves. Since we are currently in the midst of the seventh wave, which is a wave that 
has lasted for eight years, we need to be cautious. As my macroeconomic research shows, all 
previous waves ended in an economic crisis or recession. When there is a negative shock to 
the economy, consumer confidence decreases, which consequently decreases market 
valuation. Based on my research, when valuations start to decrease so does M&A activity, 
bringing the merger wave to an end.  
 One major limitation to my research was the lack of valuation data for companies 
before 1990. Since many companies that merged were not public before that time, it was not 
possible to find data on stock price or the number of shares outstanding, and therefore I was 
unable to calculate their market caps. There was also limited data on mergers during the fifth 
and sixth wave, which limited the extent to which I could study the values of companies pre 
and post-merger. As seen in tables 1 and 2, I only had nine mergers to sample for both of 
those waves, which is not a representative sample. Additionally, since I only studied the 
biggest M&A transactions in each wave, the data is not representative of all mergers that 
took place during the period 
 If I had more time and resources to create an optimal study for this topic, I would 
create aggregate indicators of both the neoclassical and behavioral theories (ie: indicators for 
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the Q-theory, agency cost theory, market timing theory, etc). By looking at the sum of each 
indicator during each wave, we would be able to better understand the drivers behind each 
wave and whether they side with the neoclassical theory or behavioral theory. I also would 
look for more commonly used measures of elevated market sentiment (investors’ attitudes 
towards the market) at the aggregate level (all industries combined). With these measures, I 
would analyze the extent to which they explain the volume of transactions in a given year, 
and whether those transactions weigh more heavily in years of merger waves. Lastly, I 
would use past data to predict where we are in the latest merger wave given our current 
economic state. By doing so, we could predict if we are now at the top of the merger wave, 
or on the downside, which could signal that we are close to another economic contradiction. 
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